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THE DYNAMICS OF STRATEGIC DECISION-MAKING:  
USING UPDATED INFORMATION FROM THE FRONTLINE 
 
Abstract 
Effective strategy-making in turbulent industries needs current insights that can inform ongoing 
decisions around adaptive strategic moves. Frontline employees involved in the daily business 
transactions are the first to see the subtle changes not otherwise observed by top managers. Top 
management with dominant logics anchored in previous business contexts usually receive updated 
information from performance reports for prior periods. All the while, we discern a human 
inclination linked to the position of power where managers subconsciously discard updated 
information from frontline employees. We present an experiment to investigate these effects and 
discuss the implications for strategic response capabilities among firms.            
 
Keywords:  dominant logics, dynamic responses, frontline information, power biases, strategic 
adaptation, strategic response capabilities,  
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INTRODUCTION 
Strategic management is often conceived as a systematic analytical approach to understand dynamic changes 
in the business environment and planning adaptive moves to the changing context (e.g., Andrews, 1984; 
Ansoff, 1988; Lorange, 1982; Richards, 1986; Schendel and Hofer, 1979). Strategic adaptation can also arise 
from dispersed decisions (e.g., Bower, 1970; Cyert and March, 1963; Lindblom, 1959) as autonomous 
actions respond to new opportunities (e.g., Bower and Gilbert, 2005; Burgelman, 1982, 1991; Mintzberg, 
1973, 1994). So, effective strategy-making arguably derives from a combination of central and decentralized 
responses (e.g., Andersen, 2004, 2013; Burgelman and Grove, 1996, 2007; Mintzberg, 1978; Mintzberg and 
Waters, 1985). The related response capabilities require that emerging changes can be foreseen to consider 
initiatives that will create a better fit with the evolving context (e.g., Adner and Helfat, 2003; Andersen, 
Denrell and Bettis, 2007; Bettis and Hitt, 1995; Teece, Pisano and Shuen, 1997; Teece, 2007). While these 
sensing capabilities are a prerequisite for strategic adaptation (Teece, 2007), important updated information 
is typically not collected for ongoing strategic decision-making.  
Emerging environmental changes are typically sensed by a firm’s frontline employees first. 
Thus, the interplay between executives at the corporate center and dispersed managers and employees can 
elicit new insights and update the knowledge for strategic decision-making (e.g., Ansoff, 1980; Dutton and 
Duncan, 1987; Dutton, 1993; Goold and Quinn, 1990; Simons, 1990, 1991, 1994). Hence, we propose that 
the frontline employees are an important source of information for adaptive strategic decisions (Hallin, 2015; 
Hallin, Tveterås and Andersen, 2012; Hallin, Andersen and Tveterås, 2013). However, we also discern an 
unwillingness among executives to use the frontline information due to cognitive rigidities (e.g., Dutton, 
1993) and power related biases (e.g., Blader and Chen, 2012; Tost, Gino and Larrick, 2013).      
In the following, we first position the issue of in formation updating in the strategic decision-
making literature and consider the implications for timely use of updated frontline information. We theorize 
about the importance of the subjective experience of power among executive decision-makers and their 
inability to learn from updated insights from frontline employees. We introduce an experiment with business 
students in a classroom setting to examine these effects and discuss the implications for effective strategic 
adaptation. 
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BACKGROUND 
Strategic decision-making 
Strategy-making can be seen as a string of resource-committing decisions and actions taken over time at the 
strategic apex of the organization (Bower, 1986; Bower and Gilbert, 2005, 2007; Mintzberg, 1978). The 
making of strategic decisions has been a central focus in strategy research for decades although characterized 
as “a ‘crazy quilt’ of perspectives” with “mature paradigms and incomplete assumptions” (Eisenhardt and 
Zbaracki, 1992). In this context, we want to focus on the important information acquisition process as a 
necessary prerequisite to understand the decision situation and develop valid alternative initiatives to deal 
with fast turbulent changes. Strategic decisions are ideally made on the basis of comprehensive analyses and 
plans for adaptive initiatives informed by insights on emerging developments gathered from decentralized 
operations. This process is often conceived around annual planning and budgeting cycles with periodic 
management reports for monthly/quarterly review meetings in conventional diagnostic control processes. 
However, the process is informed by accounting information whereas updated insights about emerging 
developments typically are missing from the analyses. Studies on strategic issue selling and interactive 
controls have considered how this information updating can occur (Dutton, 1993?).  
An ideal decision-making process is informed to define the (real) problem and determine 
boundary conditions for possible solutions (Drucker, 1967). However, the attempt at rational decision-
making is subsumed by bounded rationality, political power, psychological factors, cognitive heuristics and 
biases, etc. (Kahneman and Tversky, 1982; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1974, 1977; Schwenck, 1984, 1995; Simon, 
1959, 1979). Executives develop a ‘dominant logic’ representing experiences from specific business contexts 
(Bettis and Prahalad, 1995) that exposes them to common biases of availability, retrievability, 
representativeness, anchoring, confirmation traps, etc. (Bazerman and Moore, 2009). Hence, we know that 
executive decisions are influenced by judgmental errors (Campbell, Whitehead and Finkelstein, 2009). 
The literature on such errors is unequivocal. In a study of strategic decision-making processes 
Shrivastava and Grant (1985) identify adaptive planning as an important precursor to adaptive strategy-
making. However, it is shown that executive cognition influences adaptive decisions and how they are made 
(Papadakis, Lioukas and Chambers, 1998). Strategic issue diagnosis (SID) favor change decisions when they 
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are framed as urgent and resolvable (Dutton, Fahey and Narayanan, 1983; Dutton and Duncan, 1987). So, 
treatment of strategic issues depends on the way they are labeled and categorized (Dutton and Jackson, 
1987). Dutton (1993) argues that executives generally are driven towards unreflective/automatic SID with 
quick diagnosis, rapid decisions, and poor responses due to lack of updated information. We know that 
internal politics will slow down and obscure the decision-making process and reduce the quality of outcomes 
(Bourgeois and Eisenhardt, 1988; Eisenhardt and Bourgeois, 1988). Conversely, effective and fast strategic 
decision-making involves multiple actors and views based on comprehensive analysis of updated 
information (Eisenhardt, 1989). Hence, managers that collect broad information make more effective 
decisions whereas managers that use power and push hidden agendas are less effective (Dean and Sharfman, 
1996). That is, decision-makers that serve their own ends are associated with negative organizational 
outcomes (Child, 1997). 
Collecting updated information 
The strategy field has long acknowledged the need for faster monitoring of strategic performance in turbulent 
environments. Ansoff (1980) outlined a formal process of strategic issue management (SIM) for early 
detection of environmental events that could affect the organizational outcomes. Goold and Quinn (1990) 
identified the strategic control dilemmas caused by uncertainty about competitive developments and means-
ends effects, which suggests use of multiple qualitative indicators rather than a few quantitative measures. 
These strategic control aspects have largely been subdued in subsequent strategy research (Simons, 1994) 
where the dominant depiction of management controls remains a central diagnostic approach. The crucial 
question is what information top management will use in their adaptive planning analyses. While much 
important knowledge and insights can be, and is, transferred to corporate executives from outside contacts 
with other executives and industry specialists, they should also consider the current experiential insights at 
the operational level. This information can follow informal channels directly to top management facilitated 
by middle and line managers, but this is probably the exception rather than the norm.  
Environmental uncertainty increases the demands for current insights and timely information processing 
involving dispersed employees that are closer to the relevant information and operational expertise (e.g., 
Child and McGrath, 2001). The decentralized experiential insights of managers operating locally have 
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updated insights about ongoing changes in the business environment and these insights constitute important 
information that can update the knowledge held by top management. The experiential insights of operational 
managers and employees can be collected systematically (Hallin, 2015; Hallin, Andersen and Tveterås,  
2013) and considered in the adaptive planning discussions at the corporate center. This provides an 
opportunity to obtain unique updated information about subtle environmental changes that otherwise is 
unavailable to top management and that most of the time go unnoticed. Top managers often obtain essential 
information from colleagues and peers in the industry as well as direct reports and contacts within the 
organization, which tends to reinforce preconceived perceptions (Mintzberg, 2009). When top managers 
have a limited number of real business encounters with direct experiences, the information updating becomes 
increasingly skewed and reinforces an outdated conceptual understanding based on personal historical 
experiences. Hence, cognitive biases develop among executives as they distance themselves from the daily 
operations (e.g., Andersen and Fredens, 2013; Bazerman and Moore, 2009; Bettis and Prahalad, 1995).   
Therefore, we argue that it is essential for top management to take account of experiential learning 
from operational actions taken within the organization and consider those insights to avoid being blindsided 
by confirmation biases. That is, the adaptive planning process should be informed by current insights 
obtained from decentralized operational actors or frontline employees (Hallin, 2015; Hallin et al, 2012, 2013 
Hence, the strategic thinking of the top management team should be connected to the actions taken by 
employees and operational managers working closely together with various stakeholders of the firm in their 
daily business transactions and learn first-hand from their reactions to events as they evolve.  
Information filters and biases 
In turbulent environments organizations must deal with a large amount of information to understand complex 
situations that involve a multiplicity of competence-based knowledge among individuals (Child and 
McGrath, 2001). This must involve the operational insights and managerial expertise that preside within the 
organization. However, there are good reasons to collect the frontline information directly from the 
individual sources of experiential insights because middle and line managers tend to filter the information 
that is passed on to top management influenced by conscious or subconscious biases (Dutton, 1993). 
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Accordingly, Reitzig and Sorenson (2013) identify the existence of in-group biases where middle managers 
identify psychologically with certain parts of the organization and (unconsciously) favor projects from those 
particular subgroups. This means that mid-level managers liaising between the frontline and top management 
in many cases communicate biased information skewed in favor of their own subunit focus.  Furthermore, 
Reitzig and Maciejovsky (2014) find evidence that information brought forward and passed up to top 
management is influenced by the  management approach adopted by the organization. Hence, more 
hierarchically decentralized decision structures tend to reduce the amount of information that is passed on to 
top management because lower-level managers and employees “believe that their inputs are not taken 
seriously or are perceived as inappropriate, or that they would be sanctioned for speaking up” (Reitzig and 
Maciejovsky, 2014, p. 4). 
The frontline information is typically not collected on a systematic basis among the employees and used 
to analyze strategic decisions because top management normally relies on reports developed by the strategic 
planning staff incorporating all sorts of data, but not information collected regularly from the frontline. 
However, the frontline information is important for strategizing for a number of reasons: 
1) It reflects current adjustments and decisions made by frontline employees when they deal with 
important external constituents, e.g., customers, suppliers, partners, etc. 
2) When aggregated, these frontline adjusting acts and experiences with them are likely to reveal where 
the strategy works and where it needs to be modified. 
3) Top management decision-makers tend to think around their ‘dominant logic’ and often use 
information from management reports as opposed to hands-on insights from operations. 
4) Due to their elevated hierarchical position top management is typically motivated by exercising 
power when making decisions, where frontline employees are building their status as reliable 
counterparts to core stakeholders.  
Thus the top management team and the frontline employees are likely to think and act differently where top 
managers are more influenced by their powerful position whereas the employees are motivated by their 
status towards other internal and external stakeholders (Blader and Chen, 2012) . Since the frontline 
employees tend to build status and trusting relationships with peers, collaborators, customers, etc., they are 
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more likely to obtain unbiased feedback that is more accurate and more updated, which makes it highly 
relevant to consider for fast decision-making and strategizing.  
THE ROLE OF POWER 
A number of studies have demonstrated how performance evaluations are linked to the power position of the 
person who makes the evaluation. Hence, people that hold institutional power tend to decrease the 
performance evaluation of less powerful individuals (Kipnis, 1977). That is, as the level of an individual’s 
power increases, his/her evaluations of other people become increasingly negative and self-evaluations 
increasingly positive (Georgesen and Harris, 1998). While individuals in positions of power show a greater 
proclivity to act than those without power, it does not necessarily lead to better decision outcomes (Galinsky 
and Magee, 2003). Hence, an experience of power is associated with a lower weighting and regard for the 
advice provided by other people (Tost, Gina and Larrick, 2012). The subjective experience of power 
increases the amount of talking in various decision fora as feelings of power devalue the perspectives and 
opinions of other people, which reduces diversity of alternative views and reduces the quality of decisions 
and performance (Tost, Gino and Larrick, 2013). Individuals that are sensitive to the power of their 
hierarchical position are more likely to make decisions irrespective of what others think and they tend to 
allocate more resources towards themselves (Dunbar and Bresser, 2014). That is, if individuals believe in 
their power position they tend to prioritize their own interests and criteria when making decisions at the 
expense of other peoples’ concerns (Blader and Chen, 2012). In short, power seems to be an important factor 
influencing the way executives and strategic decision-makers process information and their willingness to 
consider updated information from frontline employees. To assess these influences further, we devising a 
little experiment.   
A POWERFUL EXPERIMENT 
To assess the role of power when accepting and using information from frontline employees, we set up an 
classroom experiment with undergraduate students where one group of students was primed as powerful 
executives, another group of students posed as frontline operators, and a third control group where 
respondents consisted of ‘smart’ students. The priming of the groups was performed in accordance with the 
way power was manipulated by prior research (e.g., Galinsky and Magee, 2003). Only the students that were 
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assigned to the formal executive position received the power manipulation priming them into a high-power 
organizational decision-making position, which was designed to elicit a high level of subjective feeling of 
power. The formal executives group members were asked a number of questions about prior experiences in 
powerful decision situations and they received this priming manipulation before they engaged into the 
ensuing exercise in line with the notion that individuals encode and evaluate information selectively in 
accordance with their formal role (Babcock and Loewenstein, 1997). For the exercise, we used the following 
instructions:  “You are the Chief Financial Officer of “ABC A/S” and an important member of the five-
person corporate executive team responsible only to the Board of Directors. The internal audit and the risk 
management committees report directly to you and submit regular reports often with confidential 
information. You have been summoned by the Chairman of the Board to provide her with your best estimate 
for the full 1
st
 quarter results.”  (See Appendix for the three group manipulations). 
To reinforce the priming of power, we presented a personal questionnaire to each of the 
student a week before the exercise where they briefly described their background and prior work 
experiences. We pretended to use this material to preselect students for the executive position by handing out 
the sheets with their names printed on them. However, we did not use any of the material but assigned the 
roles across the student population purely at random. 
The class exercise asked the students to fill out a one-page questionnaire and thereafter 
provide their best estimate of the first quarter earnings of ABC Company based on unaudited results for 
January and lists of comparable estimates made by top management, division heads, and various groups 
among frontline employees in the company. (See Appendix for description of the exercise and data) 
On average, the executive forecasts were more optimistic than the frontline employees operating in services. 
It was not apparent to the students, but the questionnaire referred to three different groups selected at 
random: (1) the CFO as a member of top management, (2) a service employee in the company, (3) a CBS 
student. The questionnaire for group 1 ‘primed’ the respondents as powerful people, group 2 was primed as 
co-workers, and group 3 primed as good students.   
The results suggest that people in powerful positions appear to have a positive performance bias, 
overconfidence, and tend to disregard information from the frontline compared to the people engaged in 
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operations. These findings confirm prior research that suggests that experts tend to produce overconfidence 
in judgments (Kahneman and Klein, 2009; Kahneman and Tversky, 1982). Surprisingly, the ‘neutral’ control 
group of students is even more inclined towards executive opinions than are the executives themselves (see 
table below).   
 
 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
Individuals in the organization and other close stakeholders like customers, suppliers, and partners observe 
environmental changes and gain new insights from the responsive actions taken by the firm, and when this 
information is considered in the adaptive planning process the diverse insights can help interpret the 
emerging conditions and develop more versatile and viable strategic and operational alternatives.  
              - RESULTS -
        In-Class Forecasting Exercise/Experiment
Leaders Services Students
1. 294 284 329
2. 321 294 309
3. 273 290 299
4. 310 200 294
5. 294 294 294
6. 294 285 294 *
7. 294 299 321 *
8. 312 - 320 *
9. 315 - 294 *
10. - - 315 *
11. - - 310 *
12. - - 321 *
13. - - 308 *
Average 300,8 278,0 308,3
s.d. 14,05 32,22 11,90
N 8 6 13
No show 6 8 2
New show - - 8 *
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Effective strategic adaptation in volatile environments depends on discussions informed by updated 
insights from responsive actions in different operating entities to emerging changes and demands. 
Uncovering and analyzing these insights can greatly benefit a firm’s planning efforts. This knowledge can be 
collected, communicated, and openly exchanged with individuals in other parts of the organization. Hence, it 
is important to enable connections between specialized local knowledge communities and the central 
planning function when dealing with complex organizational issues.  
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APPENDIX 
 
 
BACKGROUND 
 
Information Sheet 
Kindly provide basic information about your personal profile by completing short statements in the indicated blocks below! 
 
Name (print first and family name): 
Age (years): 
Gender (M/F): 
 
1. Have you completed other studies before entering CBS? (Y/N – if yes then briefly explain): 
2. Do you have prior work experience? (Y/N – if yes then briefly explain your experience):   
3. Do you like to make important decisions? (Y/N – if yes briefly explain why that is so):    
4. Have you been in charge of other people? (Y/N – if yes briefly explain how that worked):   
5. Are you good at organizing activities? (Y/N – if yes briefly explain how this is so):    
6. Can you analyze a situation rationally? (Y/N – if yes briefly explain how you do so):   
 
By signing this questionnaire, I authorize the use of the provided information for educational and research purposes 
only and with the understanding that my individual information will remain confidential and that no reporting will 
reveal my personal identity and that results are solely communicated in aggregated form.  
 
Signature: _______________ 
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Group 1 (Top executives): 
 
PRIMING 
 
Performance Sheet 
 
Name:  __________________________ 
 
You have been pre-selected for a leadership position as part of the executive management team in a firm 
based on your personal credentials – on this basis please respond diligently to the following questions! 
 
1. Think about a prior situation where you have been team leader with decisive power and briefly explain 
how you experienced this role:   
2. In what way do you think you can best influence things as a leader? (briefly explain):   
3. What do you do with a person that refuses to follow orders? (briefly explain):   
4. How do you manage the people in your charge? (briefly explain):    
5. How do you make the team/organization follow your decisions? (briefly explain):   
6. How does it feel to have a major influence on decisions? (briefly explain):  
 
Thanks for your valuable answers – now please turn to the next page to perform your assessment. 
 
EXERCISE 
You are the Chief Financial Officer of “ABC A/S” and an important member of the five-person corporate 
executive team responsible only to the Board of Directors. The internal audit and the risk management 
committees report directly to you and submit regular reports often with confidential information.  
You have been summoned by the Chairman of the Board to provide her with your best estimate for the full 
1
st
 quarter results. You have the indicative (unaudited) results for the month of January stand around DKK 
105 million and you also have data on various internal bets on the full quarter result (see below). 
Please provide your best estimate for the 1
st
 quarter result:  DKK ____________ million (full number) 
Briefly explain the reasoning behind your estimate: 
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Group 2 (Field operators) 
 
PRIMING 
 
Performance Sheet 
 
Name:  __________________________ 
 
You have been chosen to represent a field position as a local expert in a functional area of the corporation 
– on this basis please respond to the following questions! 
1. Think about a prior situation where you have been in a team and briefly explain how it worked: 
2. In what way do you feel the team worked the best? (briefly explain):   
3. What did you do when a team member failed to collaborate? (briefly explain):   
4. How do you think a team should be managed? (briefly explain):    
5. How would you contribute to the team? (briefly explain):   
6. How does it feel to exchange views among team members? (briefly explain):  
 
Thanks for your responses – now kindly turn to the next page to complete a little exercise. 
 
EXERCISE 
 
You are one of the field operators in company “ABC A/S” with responsibility for customer services for all 
products sold by ABC in your regional area. With your direct involvement in daily field operations and 
regular customer contacts, you have a lot of insights about how things are evolving.  
The HR Department has sent you a request – together with your other colleagues – to provide an individual 
(confidential) estimate on the ABC Company’s full 1st quarter results. The indicative (unaudited) results for 
the month of January are reported at DKK 105 million, but the number is rather uncertain.  
Various people in the organization have already made their bets on the expected result (see below). 
Please provide your best estimate for the 1
st
 quarter result:  DKK ____________ million (full number) 
Briefly explain the reasoning behind your estimate:  
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Group 3 (Students) 
 
PRIMING 
 
Performance Sheet 
 
Name:  __________________________ 
 
You participation in this exercise is solely for educational purposes. Before we begin please respond to the 
following questions. 
1. What do you think about your current studies? (briefly explain):   
2. How do you think your studies will be useful for you? (briefly explain):  
3. In what way do you want to focus your studies? (briefly explain):   
4. How do you manage your studies effectively? (briefly explain 
5. How do you arrange your own study preparations? (briefly explain):   
6. What does your ideal study program look like? (briefly explain):  
 
Thanks for completing the answers – now please go to the next page and run the exercise. 
 
EXERCISE 
Company “ABC A/S” is a producer of multiple (related) products that are sold across different but adjacent 
geographical regions. As a business student you are called to provide an assessment of current results in the 
company applying your analytical skills.  
Hence, you are requested to provide your own individual (and confidential) estimate on the ABC Company’s 
full 1
st
 quarter results. The indicative (unaudited) results for the month of January are reported at DKK 105 
million, but the number is rather uncertain at the moment.  
Various people in the organization have already made their bets on the expected result (see below). 
Please provide your best estimate for the 1
st
 quarter result:  DKK ____________ million (full number) 
Briefly explain the reasoning behind your estimate:  
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DATA 
Best estimates by: 
Chief Executive Officer:  DKK 324 million 
Chief Operating Officer:  DKK 295 million 
Chief Marketing Officer:  DKK 348 million 
Chief Risk Officer:  DKK 317 million 
Head of Product 1:  DKK 276 million 
Head of Product 2:  DKK 355 million 
Head of Product 3:  DKK 304 million 
Head HR Department:  DKK 345 million 
Head of Engineering:  DKK 324 million 
Head of R&D:  DKK 295 million 
Head of Region 1:  DKK 263 million 
Head of Region 2:  DKK 305 million 
Head of Region 3:  DKK 284 million 
Floor managers (1-16): 325, 256, 224, 357, 276, 354, 243, 341, 229, 246, 239, 248, 286, 325, 276, 328 (DKK 
million) 
Customer handling (1-24): 341, 229, 246, 239, 248, 286, 325, 276, 328, 341, 229, 246, 339, 248, 286, 325, 
276, 328, 341, 229, 246, 239, 348, 289 (DKK million)  
Servicing agents (1-22): 256, 224, 357, 376, 274, 254, 243, 341, 229, 357, 376, 254, 243, 341, 256, 224, 357, 
276, 254, 243, 341, 356 (DKK million) 
Field operators (1-38): 276, 254, 243, 376, 254, 243, 341, 229, 254, 243, 341, 229, 246, 239, 248, 278, 354, 
243, 341, 229, 246, 239, 248, 276, 254, 243, 341, 229, 339, 248, 276, 254, 343, 276, 254, 243, 378, 341 
(DKK million) 
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                         1st Quarter performance predictions - Summary statistics
Observation # EMT DIV Fkt 1 Fkt 2 Fkt 3 Fkt 4
1 324 276 325 341 256 276
2 295 355 256 229 224 254
3 348 304 224 246 357 243
4 317 345 357 239 376 376
5 324 276 248 274 254
6 295 354 286 254 243
7 263 243 325 243 341
8 305 341 276 341 229
9 284 229 328 229 254
10 246 341 357 243
11 239 229 376 341
12 248 246 254 229
13 286 339 243 246
14 325 248 341 239
15 276 286 256 248
16 328 325 224 278
17 276 357 354
18 328 276 243
19 341 254 341
20 229 243 229
21 246 341 246
22 239 356 239
23 348 248
24 289 276
25 254
26 243
27 341
28 229
29 339
30 248
31 276
32 254
33 343
34 276
35 254
36 243
37 378
38 341
Mean value 321 306 285 285 292 276
Standard deviation 22 31 47 44 56 47
Minimum value 295 263 224 229 224 229
Maximum value 348 355 357 348 376 378
Max. - Min. (range) 53 92 133 119 152 149
EMT = Executive management team Fkt 1 = Funktional team members 1
DIV = Division heads Fkt 2 = Funktional team members 2
Fkt 3 = Funktional team members 3
Fkt 4 = Funktional team members 4
17 
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